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Abstract— This paper considers multiple network attacks in 
a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET). MANET is a type of 
network that does not require any infrastructure for nodes to 
communicate with each other. The general assumption in 
MANET is that each node is a trusted node. However, due to its 
lack of infrastructure and dynamic topology, the MANET is 
exposed to network layer attacks. In this paper, some of the 
network layer attacks such as the black hole attack, worm hole 
attack and gray hole attack are discussed. Frequent multiple 
network attacks are highlighted, and the identification of 
collaborative network attacks is discussed. There are several 
symptoms and observations in a network that signal the 
presence of an attack and some of the symptoms of these attacks 
will be highlighted. Finally, an analysis of existing multiple 
network attacks will be discussed, and the identification of 
prospective multiple network attacks is considered. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a self-organized and 
self-configuring temporary network of independent mobile nodes 
connected by wireless links. There is no fixed infrastructure or 
centralized administration in this type of network [1]. With the 
widespread availability of cheaper, smaller and more powerful 
mobile devices, MANETs have grown into one of the fastest areas 
of research. MANETs have been widely used in several applications 
such as emergency operations, disaster relief, military crisis 
operations, maritime communications, vehicle networks, business 
meetings, and site networks [2].  
In ad hoc networks, mobile nodes can move, join and leave the 
network dynamically and routes need to be updated frequently due 
to its dynamic nature. The nodes in MANETs communicate with one 
another via wireless links and act both as a host and a router. Packets 
are forwarded to the correct node in a network after route 
establishment to transfer their information to other nodes [3]. For 
instance, a network consisting of mobile nodes where node (X) is a 
source node and node (Y) is a destination node as shown in figure 1. 
Node (X) can communicate with node (Y) by using the shortest path 
{X-A-D-Y} but if node (A) moves out of range with node (X), then 
node (X) has to seek an alternative route to node (Y) possibly using 
the path {X-B-C-D-Y}. 
 
Fig. 1. Communication between nodes in MANET 
 
A variety of new protocols have been developed for finding and 
updating routes as well as providing communication between nodes. 
It should be noted that no proposed routing protocol has been 
accepted as standard yet and existing routing protocols suffer from 
new forms of attacks [1]. Much research has been done to detect and 
prevent attacks against existing routing protocols in MANET. That 
research includes secure routing protocols and intrusion detection 
systems. 
MANETs are more vulnerable to malicious attacks than wired 
networks due to their open mediums and continuously changing 
network topologies. Thus, malicious attackers are able to learn ways 
of changing the information of a particular data packet. In such 
cases, it is important to have an efficient intrusion detection system 
(IDS) in place to protect MANETs from attacks and enhance their 
security levels [4].  
Much existing research work concerning MANETs dealt with 
prevention and detection approaches to combat individual node 
attack. In this regard, the effectiveness of these approaches can 
become weak when multiple malicious nodes collude together to 
initiate a collaborative attack, which may result in more devastating 
damage to the network. It is possible for a MANET to be vulnerable 
to different types of attacks simultaneously [5]. This paper presents 
a fundamental understanding of one of the existing routing 
protocols, Ad hoc On Demand Vector (AODV) routing protocol. 
Furthermore, an overview of the network attacks that affect 
MANET will be investigated, finishing with multiple and 
collaborative attacks and how they might be detected.  
II. AD HOC ON-DEMAND DISTANCE VECTOR 
AODV routing protocol plays a role in identifying and 
transmitting packets from a source node to a destination node 
through intermediate nodes. AODV requests a route when it needs 
to send a packet from a source node to its destination node [4] as 
seen in Fig 2. AODV includes three messages: route request 
(RREQ), route reply (RREP) and route error [6]. In AODV, each 
node has its own sequence number, this number increases a change 
in links; where a high sequence indicates the latest route. For 
example, when a source node wishes to route a packet to a 
destination node, the source node initiates route discovery, a source 
node broadcasts an RREQ message with the sequence number. Each 
of the intermediate nodes checks if it has fresh route to the 
destination node [6]. The respective intermediate nodes compare the 
sequence numbers with the sequence number in the RREQ packet. 
If the sequence number of the receiving node is greater than the 
sequence number in the RREQ message, it will generate a unicast 
RREP message to the source node. However, if the sequence 
number of the receiving node is less than the sequence number in 
the RREQ message, it will further broadcast the RREQ to other 
nodes. Eventually, the source nodes will get RREP packets from 
multiple nodes and accept the path with a higher sequence number, 
because a high sequence number is seen as an updated path [7]. 
Every mobile node maintains a routing table that consists of route 
directions to the destination. The AODV keeps information about 
routing tables but only recent routes. If an entry is not used, it 
eventually discards it [8].  
 
Fig. 2.   AODV Protocol 
III. NETWORK ATTACKS ON MANET 
MANETs are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on 
the network layer. These attacks can be classified into three types: 
Routing disruption, Forwarding disruption and Resource 
consumption attacks [4]. Routing disruption is caused by wormhole 
attack, black hole attack and gray hole attack. Also, Jellyfish, 
directional antenna abusing are forward disruption attacks, while 
control packets flood and packet injection attacks are resource 
consumption attacks [9]. However, the focus of this paper is on 
routing disruption attacks. 
A. Blackhole Attack 
In Black hole attacks, a malicious node exploits the 
vulnerabilities of the route discovery procedure of AODV by 
advertising the wrong paths as good paths to the source node. The 
malicious node sends a RREP with a destination sequence number 
larger than the sequence number in the RREQ message, thus 
indicating that it has a fresh route to the destination [10]. The source 
node then selects this route and the malicious node captures all data 
forwarded on that route and creates a hole in the network. The 
malicious node completely discards the traffic [7]. In the presence 
of a black hole attack, no traffic along that route is delivered. In Fig 
3, node C acts as the black hole node. Hence, all traffic from source 
node A to destination node F is dropped. The performance of the 
network is degraded as a result of this attack. 
 
Fig. 3.  Blackhole attack 
B. Wormhole Attack 
In wormhole attacks, a malicious node captures data at one point 
in a network and sends them through a tunnel to another malicious 
node as seen in Fig 4. The tunnel creates an illusion to the source 
node that the two malicious nodes are one hop away and hence 
provides the shortest path to the destination. The creation of the 
tunnel increases their chances of being selected as part of the route 
and they then attempt to drop all incoming and outgoing packets, 
causing a denial of service in the network [8]. A tunnel can be 
established by either an In-Band Channel or Out-Band Channel. In 
an Out-Band Channel the colluding malicious nodes establish a 
direct link between the two colluding nodes by long range wireless 
transmission or by a private high-speed network. On the other hand, 
In an In-band channel it uses encapsulation to develop a covert 
overlay tunnel over the existing wireless medium. Wormhole attack 
is possible even if all communications provide authenticity and 
confidentiality[11]. The wormhole attack can be launched 
individually or collaboratively. In wormhole attacks, the return trip 
time (RTT) of packets appear shorter and rate of packet delivery is 
faster than usual. Not every wormhole is malicious, therefore in the 
presence of malicious activity, packets can be dropped between the 
two wormhole nodes, thereby degrading the performance of the 
network [12]. 
 
Fig. 4. Worm Hole attack 
C. Gray Hole Attack 
Gray hole attacks (sometimes referred to as selective 
forwarding) consist of two phases. In the first phase the malicious 
node exploits the vulnerabilities of the route discovery process of 
the routing protocol by advertising itself as having a valid route to 
destination while in the second phase, the malicious node drops the 
intercepted packets with a certain probability. For instance, the 
attacker may drop packets coming from specific nodes while 
forwarding all the packets for other nodes or it may drop packets for 
some time and behave normally for the rest of the time. Gray hole 
attack detection is difficult [10]. In a gray hole attack, the malicious 
node can simply drop packets coming to it from some specific nodes, 
while it forwards the others. Also, gray hole could happen for 
particular time duration, where packets are transmitted at a 
particular period of time and dropped for a certain duration. Finally, 
gray hole attack could drop packets randomly while forwarding the 
remaining packets. Gray hole attack is a variation of black hole 
attack and is more difficult to detect [5]. 
IV. COLLABORATIVE NETWORK ATTACKS 
 There have been several attempts to detect multiple attacks 
working individually or collaboratively in MANET and other 
network types. This section considers combined attacks under any 
network type.  
A. Blackhole and Gray hole attacks 
Woungang [5]proposed a cooperative bait detection system 
(CBDS) approach to detect collaborative black hole or gray hole 
attacks. This approach was implemented using AODV routing 
protocol in order to reduce routing overhead associated with CBDS 
using Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. The results show 
that CBDS using DSR performs better than the standard DSR 
protocol. Likewise, simulation results show that CBDS using 
AODV performs better than CBDS using DSR in terms of 
throughput and packet delivery ratio. 
An improved bait detection system (IBDS) approach over 
AODV routing protocol was proposed to detect network attacks 
[13]. The IBDS combines proactive and reactive schemes to save 
resources. The results show reductions in energy consumption and 
routing overhead as well as an increase in packet delivery ratio. This 
approach could also be used to detect other attacks such as 
wormhole attack and denial of service. 
Rana [14] proposed an enhanced, modified AODV for detecting 
and preventing malicious nodes in MANETs in the presence of 
single individual attacks or collaborative black hole and gray hole 
attacks. The simulation results show that this method performs 
better than the standard AODV routing protocol in detecting 
individual and collaborative attacks. The network metrics used were 
routing overhead, packet delivery ratio and throughput. The 
proposed approach was not efficient in a large network as its routing 
overhead increased with increase in network size. The attack 
cooperation was between nodes of black hole attack.  
Singh Bindra et al [15] proposed a modified AODV routing 
protocol using a data routing information (DRI). The DRI is used at 
each node and a cross-checking method was performed to detect 
cooperative black hole nodes and gray hole attacks in the network. 
The protocol could also discover secure paths from the source to the 
destination node. This method could only work when the malicious 
nodes were consecutive while operating in cooperation. Thus, non-
consecutive cooperating nodes could not be detected. 
In [16] an approach was proposed to defend against a black hole 
attack and selective forwarding attack in a wireless sensor network. 
The proposed technique used an updated active trust scheme and 
data routing scheme along with data type checking during routing. 
The Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm was also used to 
enhance the privacy of data by encrypting it before the routing 
started. The method could only defend against these attacks 
individually and not when in collaboration with each other. 
In [10], a method was proposed to detect and prevent black, gray 
and cooperative black hole attacks in MANET over AODV routing 
protocols. The technique used a multi-level mobile backbone 
network. The technique also involved the trust value of mobile 
nodes as well as their location and power. The proposed technique 
performed better than standard AODV, intrusion detection system 
techniques and hash-function techniques. Furthermore, the 
technique could only tackle cooperation between similar attacks and 
not different attacks. 
B. Blackhole and Wormhole attacks 
In [17], a trusted secure AODV routing protocol was proposed 
to alleviate the effects of unified attacks such as black hole, worm 
hole and collaborative black hole attacks in MANET. The attacks 
were simulated simultaneously on a network. The results obtained 
showed better performances using network metrics like packet 
delivery ratio, end to end delay and throughput as compared to 
standard AODV protocol. 
Mehta [18] demonstrated the performances of MANETs using 
network parameters such as throughput and packet delay against 
black hole attack and wormhole attack. However, the focus of the 
paper was on the individual impacts of these attacks. The routing 
protocol AODV was implemented, and the results show how data 
loss confirmed the presence of these attacks as well as the impact on 
network connectivity. Kaur [7] proposed a technique to defend black 
hole and wormhole attack in a wireless sensor network as well as 
helping to increase network lifetime. This is different from the 
traditional way of proposing one single approach to mainly 
defending from one type of attack. However, the author did not 
provide any simulation or results to support the proposed 
algorithms. 
Patidar [19] proposed a protocol based on the concept of a 
specification-based detection system to detect black hole attack and 
a hop count analysis approach to detect wormhole attack in a 
MANET. The results show that increasing the number of nodes does 
not affect the performance of these strategies. Rather it is the 
mobility of the nodes that affect the routing protocols most. The 
proposed protocols showed superior performance as throughput and 
packet delivery ratio increases. However, these protocols led to an 
increase in the average end to end delay 
C. Wormhole and Gray hole attacks 
In [20], a lightweight trust mechanism for securing Routing Protocol 
for Low Power Lossy network (RPL) against wormhole and gray 
hole attacks was proposed. The proposed method used direct trust 
which was computed based on node properties and Indirect Trust 
which is based on opinion of the neighbouring nodes. However, it 
could not detect collaborative wormhole and gray hole attacks. 
V. TACKLING COLLABORATIVE ATTACKS 
Collaborative network attacks are not limited to MANET but 
can exist in other network systems [21] and cyber physical systems 
[22][23]. The way to tackle collaborative network attacks is by 
detecting the anomalies that could be present in the network. So, to 
detect collaborative network attacks, some symptoms have to be 
known. These symptoms include the status of the route request 
queries (RREQ), route request replies (RREP) and the transmitted 
data. At the moment, only symptoms and observations of individual 
network attacks have been highlighted. However new symptoms and 
observations are required to efficiently identify and tackle 
collaborative network attacks. 
Symptoms of network attacks are collections of network 
anomalies caused by malicious nodes. Each symptom can be 
separated into a set of activities of an attacker. The activities of a 
malicious node can be observed. The observations are a list of 
misuse of packets exchanged in a network. The observations consist 
of data packets misuse, and incorrect routing packets in a MANET 
[24]. 
Some of the observations in these attacks include modified 
RREQ and RREP packets, delay and loss of RREQ, RREP and data 
packets. However, an uncommon observation of the blackhole and 
gray hole attack is a surge of RREQ and RREP packets. While in 
wormhole attack, the unusual observation is the encapsulation of 
RREQ, RREP and Data packets [25]. One or more observations can 
determine symptoms listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Symptoms of Network attacks 
 
 
Increase in the number of neighbours, low hop count replies and 
non-broadcast of RREQ by malicious nodes are symptoms that can 
indicate the behaviour of black hole, wormhole and gray hole 
attacks. These symptoms are influenced by encapsulation of 
packets, rushing of RREQ and RREP packets and modification and 
sending of fake RREP. 
Increase in packet delivery time, reception of the same message 
and presence of asymmetrical links indicate the presence of a 
wormhole attack. These symptoms are primarily due to the creation 
of a tunnel between the wormhole nodes. 
Similar hop counts to various destinations, the sending of quick 
RREP, and occurrence of data loss indicate the behaviour of black 
hole and gray hole attacks. However, in a black hole attack, the 
malicious node stops sending packets entirely while in a gray hole 
attack, randomly selected packets are sent. 
The occurrence of considerable propagation delay and 
fluctuating data losses in the network alludes to the presence of 
wormhole and gray hole attacks. These symptoms are the basis on 
which proposed detection method is evaluated. 
Table 1 lists individual symptoms for network attacks. However, 
a collaborative attack such as a wormhole and gray hole attack could 
involve a combinations of some of these symptoms.  
Two common symptoms to indicate a possible collaborated 
wormhole and gray hole attack, are large propagation delay and 
unusually high or fluctuation of data packet. Initial experiments 
confirm these newly discovered symptoms. Some simultaneous 
procedures have been carried out which don’t require any special 
hardware. Furthermore, the initial method addressed in early 
experiments utilised a blacklist and a local clock. 
The concept of RTT and packet forwarding ratio is used to 
notice the occurrence of these attacks. If a source node requires a 
route to a destination node, it initiates a route discovery and sends 
the packet through a designated route. The source node collects the 
round trip time (RTT) of each intermediate node the packets goes 
through and computes the RTT values of two successive nodes. 
These RTT values should be the same or similar. A wormhole 
attack will result in an unusual pattern of such pairs of RTT values. 
Possible collaborated attacks will cause significant increases 
between the pairs of RTTs. Initial experiments have shown these 
symptoms, however further investigations and developments will 
be needed. These experiments are analysed elsewhere.  
In addition, every node in the network is set as a monitoring 
node. Every such node estimates the packet forwarding ratio (PFR) 
of its neighbouring nodes. If PFR of any node exceeds the 
threshold, the monitoring node sends an alarm to the source node. 
The source node adds these malicious nodes to the blacklist and 
informs other nodes to remove them from their respective routing 
table and neighbour nodes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
MANETs are vulnerable to network routing disruption attacks 
such as blackhole, wormhole and gray hole attacks. These attacks 
could happen individually or in a collaborative manner. In the initial 
study of this work, it is concluded that the two most likely 
combinations of collaborative attacks are between blackhole and 
gray hole attacks, and black hole and wormhole attacks. An initial 
investigation confirmed that there is no research in the literature to 
tackle collaborative wormhole and gray hole attacks in MANET. 
Symptoms associated with network routing attacks were discussed, 
leading to possible symptoms of collaborative attacks. Furthermore, 
initial ideas for detecting collaborative wormhole and gray hole 
attacks have been proposed, investigated and experimented. The 
proposed method considered RTT and PFR. This method does not 
require synchronized clocks or any specialised hardware. In future, 
Investigations will consider more unique symptoms related to 
collaborative network attacks; particularly the combined wormhole 
and gray hole attack. The proposed work may be extended using 
further performance metrics such as packet delivery ratio, routing 
overhead and end to end delay. 
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